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SPEC v0.21: D-120 Nginx Proxy Manager instead of Caddy and cert-sync; D-121 Android host property

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SPEC §10.5 rewritten (10.5.1 Nginx Proxy Manager, 10.5.2 Custom Nginx Configuration, 10.5.3 Fallback:
NPM down); Caddy and cert-sync text replaced in §1, §6.1, §7, §8.5, §8.7, §8.9, §10 intro, §10.1 to §10.4,
§10.7, §10.10, §11.2 to §11.4, OQ-3, OQ-6, E-7 and §14.7; the Kvitt host name is KVITT_PUBLIC_HOST.
D-121: kvitt.publicHost, RELEASE_SERVER_URL and @ReleaseServerUrl (AC-2.6, AC-2.7, §10.6, §13.3 S-1).
Decisions D-120 and D-121 with pointers in D-023, D-103 to D-106 and D-117; HANDOFF; prompts/README;
a superseded-in-part note on PLAN-M2c-pi; dated D-120 notes under M-2, L-1, L-2, L-8 and I-5.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TQd3pEP9UeN2uifbHknQ7B
This commit is contained in:
Jacob Hagstedt
2026-10-19 20:04:09 +02:00
parent d090c6c850
commit 4bcff2cf89
6 changed files with 191 additions and 147 deletions
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docs/decisions.md
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@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ entry and the old one a strike-through plus a pointer. The spec is updated in th
| D-020 | 2026-10-17 | No bundled font: the app uses the Material 3 default typeface. No licence step. | PLAN-M6 open point (b); avoids a font licence clearance. | SPEC §6.2, §11.2, §13.4; PLAN-M2b, PLAN-M6, PLAN-U1, PLAN-U2 |
| D-021 | 2026-10-17 | `sync_mutations` pruning runs daily at 04:00 Europe/Stockholm (DST-aware), deleting rows whose `received_at` is older than 90 days. | PLAN-M4 open point (c); the spec said only "daily". | SPEC §14.1 (rules text, not the DDL), §14.4.9, §11.2; PLAN-M4 |
| D-022 | 2026-10-17 | Development infrastructure (M2c-dev, landed `c885aba`). No new CLI installs: Firebase project and Android apps through the Firebase Management REST API with a `gcloud` access token, no Firebase CLI; `rclone` belongs to M2c-pi. The agent may write git-ignored secrets, `google-services.json` included, under `infra/secrets/`; M8 copies it into `android/app/` with `infra/dev/copy-google-services.sh`. Phone health check against the dev server is a HUMAN step. Gate: `docker compose -f infra/dev/compose.yaml --env-file infra/dev/.env.example config`; `shellcheck $(find infra -name '*.sh')`. As built: dev stack without Caddy or TLS, bind-mounted data folder, the whole `infra/secrets/` mounted read-only at `/secrets` (a missing key file means push disabled), env file `infra/dev/.env.example` (the Pi's stays `infra/env.example` for M2c-pi), `kvitt-server healthcheck` used by compose, backups with `sqlite3 .backup` (§10.9). The server must start when `KVITT_TRUSTED_PROXY` does not resolve. Firebase on `kvitt-1337` with apps `se.hagstedt.kvitt` and `se.hagstedt.kvitt.debug`; service account `kvitt-fcm@kvitt-1337.iam.gserviceaccount.com` with `roles/firebasecloudmessaging.admin` (`roles/firebasemessaging.admin` does not exist). | Owner's tools already on the Mac; M2c-dev report. | SPEC §10 intro, §10.4, §10.7, §11.2, §11.3, §14.7; PLAN-M2c-dev, PLAN-M8 |
| D-023 | 2026-10-17 | M2c-pi: ~~key-based SSH to the Kvitt Pi and the Gitea credentials are HUMAN steps; the allowances to act on the Kvitt Pi, the Home Assistant Pi, Gitea and Google Drive are requested from the owner at the start of that sprint;~~ (revised by D-100: no SSH from the Mac to the Pis and no agent allowances; the owner runs the `infra/pi/` bundle; the Gitea credentials stay a HUMAN step); the Gitea Actions workflow lives at `.gitea/workflows/`, owned by M2c-pi; secret files on the Pi (`ha_ssh_key`, `ha_known_hosts`, ~~`rclone.conf`~~) mode 0600 owned by uid 1000, the uid of the `cert-sync` ~~and `backup`~~ container (revised by D-105: `backup` runs as uid 10001 and `rclone.conf` is owned by 10001:10001); adding `gitea.lan` to `insecure-registries` is its own HUMAN step. | PLAN-M2c-pi open points (a) to (c). | SPEC §10.2, §10.3, §11.2, §11.3, §14.7; PLAN-M2c-pi |
| D-023 | 2026-10-17 | M2c-pi: ~~key-based SSH to the Kvitt Pi and the Gitea credentials are HUMAN steps; the allowances to act on the Kvitt Pi, the Home Assistant Pi, Gitea and Google Drive are requested from the owner at the start of that sprint;~~ (revised by D-100: no SSH from the Mac to the Pis and no agent allowances; the owner runs the `infra/pi/` bundle; the Gitea credentials stay a HUMAN step); the Gitea Actions workflow lives at `.gitea/workflows/`, owned by M2c-pi; secret files on the Pi (~~`ha_ssh_key`, `ha_known_hosts`~~, ~~`rclone.conf`~~) mode 0600 owned by uid 1000, the uid of the ~~`cert-sync`~~ ~~and `backup`~~ container (revised by D-105: `backup` runs as uid 10001 and `rclone.conf` is owned by 10001:10001; revised by D-120: cert-sync and its secrets `ha_ssh_key` and `ha_known_hosts` are removed); adding `gitea.lan` to `insecure-registries` is its own HUMAN step. | PLAN-M2c-pi open points (a) to (c). | SPEC §10.2, §10.3, §11.2, §11.3, §14.7; PLAN-M2c-pi; revised by D-100, D-105, D-120 |
| D-024 | 2026-10-17 | Release keystore: `keytool -genkeypair -v -keystore kvitt-release.jks -alias kvitt -keyalg RSA -keysize 4096 -validity 10000`, created by the owner ~~and kept outside the repository~~ (was `android/keystore/release.jks`; revised by D-101: at the repository root, git-ignored by `*.jks`); `local.properties` holds its absolute path. | §10.6 did not fix the key parameters (PLAN-M10 H-1); a keystore outside every checkout cannot be committed or deleted with a worktree. | SPEC §10.6, §11.2, §11.3; PLAN-M10 |
| D-025 | 2026-10-17 | Production Splitwise import (M11): a backup first; user ids resolved by display name from the database; CSVs copied to the Pi into `/opt/kvitt/import/`, bind-mounted read-only into `server` as `/import`; the import runs as `docker compose run --rm --entrypoint kvitt-import server ...` with the server stopped (`--entrypoint` because the image's entrypoint is `kvitt-server`); CSVs deleted afterwards. The category table stays at `server/crates/kvitt-import/data/splitwise_categories.csv`. | PLAN-M11 open points (a) to (c); PLAN-M9 table location. | SPEC §10.2, §10.8, §11.2, §11.3; PLAN-M2c-pi, PLAN-M9, PLAN-M11 |
| D-026 | 2026-10-17 | A 409 `cursor_ahead` on pull is treated as epoch recovery: cursor 0, epoch cleared, every local expense and settlement marked pending with a new `pending_mutation_id`, cycle restarted. | M5 report (`8f0e156`): a cursor ahead of the server means the server lost rows, as after a restore without `rotate-epoch`. | SPEC §14.4.2 |
@@ -107,10 +107,10 @@ entry and the old one a strike-through plus a pointer. The spec is updated in th
| D-100 | 2026-10-18 | No SSH from the Mac to the Pis. M2c-pi produces a self-contained bundle `infra/pi/` (compose file, Caddyfile, env template, install, deploy, bootstrap and backup scripts, a README checklist) that the owner copies to the Kvitt Pi and runs there. The OQ-3 values (Kvitt Pi address, Home Assistant Pi address, SSH port and user, certificate directory, SSH add-on) become placeholders the owner fills in the bundle's `.env`; OQ-3 is answered by this. Where the spec has a Mac script act on the Pi (`infra/deploy.sh`, `infra/publish-apk.sh`), the step becomes a bundle script the owner runs; M2c-pi fixes the layout inside `infra/pi/`, the script names and how images and APKs reach the Pi. M2c-pi runs as the last step before M10, after the app is proven on the phone against the development server. Agents never need allowances for the Kvitt Pi, the Home Assistant Pi, Gitea or Google Drive. Revises D-023 and the M2c-pi plan; D-001 stands. Fulfilled by D-103 to D-106 (bundle landed `2476667`). | Owner decision 2026-10-18: no agent access to the home servers; the Pi is set up once, by hand, from a checklist. | SPEC §10 intro, §10.1, §10.10, §11.1, §11.2 (M2c-pi, M10), §11.3, §12 (OQ-3); PLAN-M2c-pi |
| D-101 | 2026-10-18 | The release keystore `kvitt-release.jks` (created with the D-024 `keytool` command) lives at the repository root of the main checkout, git-ignored by the `*.jks` pattern of `.gitignore` and never committed; `android/local.properties` references it by absolute path in `kvitt.release.storeFile` with the other three `kvitt.release.*` keys. The owner keeps a copy of the file and its password in their password manager. Revises D-024 ("outside the repository"). | Owner decision 2026-10-18; the `*.jks` ignore rule already keeps the file out of git. | SPEC §10.6, §11.2 (M10), §11.3; PLAN-M10 |
| D-102 | 2026-10-18 | S-7 editor options as fixed rows. Below the category quick row, account, date, payer and split are four full-width rows in a fixed order (Konto, Datum, Betalt av, Delning) instead of a wrapping chip row, so no option moves when a value changes. Rows form a segmented group (outer corners 24, inner 8, gap 3) in surface-container-high (secondary-container while the split section is open), each at least 48 dp and tappable in full. A row has a leading element in a 24 dp box, a label (label-large, muted) in a column as wide as the widest label, the value (body-large, one line, ellipsis) and the trailing affordance at the right edge (expand_more/expand_less, swap_horiz for the payer). At ≥ 1.5× font scale the label sits over the value, which takes up to two lines, and every row keeps the two-line height. TalkBack sentences are unchanged. S-9 and S-19 keep their chips (S-19 follows in M8e, D-107). Also: connected buttons get 8 dp side padding so 'Household' fits half of S-11's filter bar at 1x. Landed by M8d (`bacbd18`): `EditorOptionRows` in `:core:design`, `KvittDimens.connectedButtonSide`. | Owner finding on S-7, 2026-10-18: the chips moved when a value changed. | SPEC §13.3 (S-7), §13.4; `docs/ux/design-spec.md` §3.7, §3.10 |
| D-103 | 2026-10-18 | The M2c-pi bundle `infra/pi/`: `compose.yaml` (was `infra/compose.yaml`), `.env.example` (was `infra/env.example`), `Caddyfile`, and the on-Pi scripts `install.sh` (idempotent: creates `/opt/kvitt/{secrets,import,apk}`, installs the secrets with their modes, adds `gitea.lan` to `insecure-registries`, sets the volume owners, starts the stack), `deploy.sh <tag> [--skip-backup]` (backs up before every deploy, because the Pi cannot tell whether a tag carries a migration; keeps `/opt/kvitt/previous-tag` for rollback), `bootstrap.sh`, `backup-now.sh`, `install-apk.sh`, helpers in `lib.sh`. APK path: `infra/publish-apk.sh` on the Mac writes `infra/pi/out/apk/` (`version_code` = `git rev-list --count HEAD`, `version_name` = `YYYY.MM.DD-<short sha>` in Europe/Stockholm, passed as `-Pkvitt.versionCode` / `-Pkvitt.versionName`; copies `mapping.txt` as `kvitt-<version_code>.mapping.txt`; refuses a dirty tree and an unsigned APK); the owner `scp`s it to `/opt/kvitt/apk/`; `install-apk.sh` copies it into the `data` volume, writing `latest.json` last and keeping the newest 5; mappings stay outside the volume. `.env` keys grow by `KVITT_REGISTRY_USER`, `KVITT_REGISTRY_TOKEN` (read by `install.sh` only) and the informational `KVITT_PI_HOST`, `KVITT_PI_SSH_USER`. The §11.2 gate becomes `docker compose -f infra/pi/compose.yaml config`. Landed `2476667`. Fulfils D-100. | M2c-pi report: D-100 left the layout, script names and the image and APK paths to M2c-pi. | SPEC §10 intro, §10.2, §10.3, §10.6, §10.7, §10.10, §11.2 (M2c-pi), §11.3, §14.7; `infra/README.md` |
| D-104 | 2026-10-18 | Images `${KVITT_REGISTRY}/kvitt-server`, `kvitt-cert-sync`, `kvitt-backup` with `KVITT_REGISTRY=gitea.lan/jacobh2` (was `${KVITT_REGISTRY}/kvitt/<name>`). `.gitea/workflows/build-images.yaml` follows the owner's working example: runner `host` (a Raspberry Pi 3, 1 GB; builds run on the runner itself), Alpine `apk add git docker-cli docker-cli-buildx`, a plain-HTTP buildx builder created once and reused, secret `kvitt_cicd`; triggers on `server/**`, `infra/cert-sync/**`, `infra/backup/**`, `.gitea/workflows/**` and `workflow_dispatch`; tags `v1.MINOR.PATCH` (the next patch after the newest tag) plus `latest`, the git tag pushed afterwards; `--build-arg CARGO_BUILD_JOBS=1` (honoured by `server/Dockerfile` since `b4d9467`; first build duration unknown). `infra/build-images.sh` on the Mac is the fallback (default tag the short SHA; builds locally and prints the push commands when `infra/secrets/registry.env` is absent). Both sidecars schedule with supercronic instead of busybox crond (crond runs no job as non-root, tested); the cert-sync image adds `openssl`. Pinned versions (2026-10-18): `caddy:2.11.7@sha256:685ae3d7c34d9b5f8caeddc5d14051db7bbd88ff1f5a2fa0c16bd8ca328fb7af`, `alpine:3.24.2@sha256:294b683cb724975bec92580e1e685676bd4b50bda910ddb8c51d4cabeaec77e6`, openssh-client-default 10.3_p1, curl 8.22.0, openssl 3.5.9, supercronic 0.2.49; Docker Engine from Docker's Debian arm64 apt repository (docs.docker.com: the Raspberry Pi OS page is 32-bit only), `docker-ce` 5:29.8.2. | M2c-pi report: the owner's example workflow pushes under the owner path with flat image names; busybox crond did not run jobs as a non-root user. | SPEC §10.1, §10.2, §10.3, §12 (OQ-1); `.gitea/workflows/build-images.yaml`, `infra/README.md` "Versions" |
| D-105 | 2026-10-18 | `backup` runs as uid 10001 on the Pi too, so it can open the WAL database (`sqlite3 .backup` needs the `-shm` file the server owns); `/opt/kvitt/secrets/rclone.conf` mode 0600 owned 10001:10001. `cert-sync` stays uid 1000 with `ha_ssh_key`, `ha_known_hosts` 0600 owned by 1000. `backup.sh` uses a temporary copy of the read-only `rclone.conf` so rclone can save refreshed tokens. `install.sh` chowns `/data`, `/data/apk`, `/backups` to 10001 and `/certs` to 1000 once. Reconciles SPEC §10.2; revises D-023 for `rclone.conf`. | M2c-pi report: uid 1000 could not back up the live database without loosening the server's files. | SPEC §10.2, §10.9; `infra/README.md` "Backup uid" |
| D-106 | 2026-10-18 | `sync.sh` always requests the `tar -C <dir> -cf - fullchain.pem privkey.pem` stream, so both `authorized_keys` variants (A restricted, B plain) work unchanged; it refuses a key not matching its certificate and a certificate expiring before the installed one; an unreachable Caddy admin API at first start is not a failure (Caddy loads the files when it starts). `backup.sh` uploads every pending `kvitt-*` / `pictures-*` file including leftovers of failed runs, confirms each by name and size with `rclone lsf`, deletes the local copies only after all are confirmed, and writes `last-success` only after that. | M2c-pi report: the add-on's support for `authorized_keys` options is unknown; rehearsal of renew, refuse and failed-upload cases on the Mac. | SPEC §10.5.1, §10.9 |
| D-103 | 2026-10-18 | The M2c-pi bundle `infra/pi/`: `compose.yaml` (was `infra/compose.yaml`), `.env.example` (was `infra/env.example`), ~~`Caddyfile`~~ (removed by D-120), and the on-Pi scripts `install.sh` (idempotent: creates `/opt/kvitt/{secrets,import,apk}`, installs the secrets with their modes, adds `gitea.lan` to `insecure-registries`, sets the volume owners, starts the stack), `deploy.sh <tag> [--skip-backup]` (backs up before every deploy, because the Pi cannot tell whether a tag carries a migration; keeps `/opt/kvitt/previous-tag` for rollback), `bootstrap.sh`, `backup-now.sh`, `install-apk.sh`, helpers in `lib.sh`. APK path: `infra/publish-apk.sh` on the Mac writes `infra/pi/out/apk/` (`version_code` = `git rev-list --count HEAD`, `version_name` = `YYYY.MM.DD-<short sha>` in Europe/Stockholm, passed as `-Pkvitt.versionCode` / `-Pkvitt.versionName`; copies `mapping.txt` as `kvitt-<version_code>.mapping.txt`; refuses a dirty tree and an unsigned APK); the owner `scp`s it to `/opt/kvitt/apk/`; `install-apk.sh` copies it into the `data` volume, writing `latest.json` last and keeping the newest 5; mappings stay outside the volume. `.env` keys grow by `KVITT_REGISTRY_USER`, `KVITT_REGISTRY_TOKEN` (read by `install.sh` only) and the informational `KVITT_PI_HOST`, `KVITT_PI_SSH_USER`. The §11.2 gate becomes `docker compose -f infra/pi/compose.yaml config`. Landed `2476667`. Fulfils D-100. | M2c-pi report: D-100 left the layout, script names and the image and APK paths to M2c-pi. | SPEC §10 intro, §10.2, §10.3, §10.6, §10.7, §10.10, §11.2 (M2c-pi), §11.3, §14.7; `infra/README.md` |
| D-104 | 2026-10-18 | Images `${KVITT_REGISTRY}/kvitt-server`, ~~`kvitt-cert-sync`~~ (removed by D-120), `kvitt-backup` with `KVITT_REGISTRY=gitea.lan/jacobh2` (was `${KVITT_REGISTRY}/kvitt/<name>`). `.gitea/workflows/build-images.yaml` follows the owner's working example: runner `host` (a Raspberry Pi 3, 1 GB; builds run on the runner itself), Alpine `apk add git docker-cli docker-cli-buildx`, a plain-HTTP buildx builder created once and reused, secret `kvitt_cicd`; triggers on `server/**`, ~~`infra/cert-sync/**`~~ (dropped by D-120), `infra/backup/**`, `.gitea/workflows/**` and `workflow_dispatch`; tags `v1.MINOR.PATCH` (the next patch after the newest tag) plus `latest`, the git tag pushed afterwards; `--build-arg CARGO_BUILD_JOBS=1` (honoured by `server/Dockerfile` since `b4d9467`; first build duration unknown). `infra/build-images.sh` on the Mac is the fallback (default tag the short SHA; builds locally and prints the push commands when `infra/secrets/registry.env` is absent). Both sidecars schedule with supercronic instead of busybox crond (crond runs no job as non-root, tested); ~~the cert-sync image adds `openssl`~~. Pinned versions (2026-10-18): ~~`caddy:2.11.7@sha256:685ae3d7c34d9b5f8caeddc5d14051db7bbd88ff1f5a2fa0c16bd8ca328fb7af`~~, `alpine:3.24.2@sha256:294b683cb724975bec92580e1e685676bd4b50bda910ddb8c51d4cabeaec77e6`, ~~openssh-client-default 10.3_p1, curl 8.22.0, openssl 3.5.9~~, supercronic 0.2.49 (revised by D-120: no Caddy pin and no cert-sync image or packages; only the backup sidecar uses supercronic); Docker Engine from Docker's Debian arm64 apt repository (docs.docker.com: the Raspberry Pi OS page is 32-bit only), `docker-ce` 5:29.8.2. | M2c-pi report: the owner's example workflow pushes under the owner path with flat image names; busybox crond did not run jobs as a non-root user. | SPEC §10.1, §10.2, §10.3, §12 (OQ-1); `.gitea/workflows/build-images.yaml`, `infra/README.md` "Versions" |
| D-105 | 2026-10-18 | `backup` runs as uid 10001 on the Pi too, so it can open the WAL database (`sqlite3 .backup` needs the `-shm` file the server owns); `/opt/kvitt/secrets/rclone.conf` mode 0600 owned 10001:10001. ~~`cert-sync` stays uid 1000 with `ha_ssh_key`, `ha_known_hosts` 0600 owned by 1000.~~ (cert-sync removed by D-120) `backup.sh` uses a temporary copy of the read-only `rclone.conf` so rclone can save refreshed tokens. `install.sh` chowns `/data`, `/data/apk`, `/backups` to 10001 ~~and `/certs` to 1000~~ once. Reconciles SPEC §10.2; revises D-023 for `rclone.conf`. | M2c-pi report: uid 1000 could not back up the live database without loosening the server's files. | SPEC §10.2, §10.9; `infra/README.md` "Backup uid" |
| D-106 | 2026-10-18 | ~~`sync.sh` always requests the `tar -C <dir> -cf - fullchain.pem privkey.pem` stream, so both `authorized_keys` variants (A restricted, B plain) work unchanged; it refuses a key not matching its certificate and a certificate expiring before the installed one; an unreachable Caddy admin API at first start is not a failure (Caddy loads the files when it starts).~~ (revised by D-120: cert-sync removed) `backup.sh` uploads every pending `kvitt-*` / `pictures-*` file including leftovers of failed runs, confirms each by name and size with `rclone lsf`, deletes the local copies only after all are confirmed, and writes `last-success` only after that. | M2c-pi report: the add-on's support for `authorized_keys` options is unknown; rehearsal of renew, refuse and failed-upload cases on the Mac. | SPEC §10.5.1, §10.9 |
| D-107 | 2026-10-18 | S-19's options as fixed rows, extending D-102. The recurring template editor replaces its wrapping chips row (Konto · Betalt av · Delning) with `EditorOptionRows`: three full-width rows in the fixed order Konto, Betalt av, Delning, with no Datum row. They look and behave as in S-7: label column, value on one line with an ellipsis, label over value with a two-line value at ≥ 1.5× font scale, and Delning in secondary-container while the split section is open. A row's place and size never depend on its value. The schedule fields stay in the "Schema" section. TalkBack sentences are unchanged. A Robolectric layout test asserts identical row bounds for short and long values at 100 % and 200 %. The chip composables stay in `:core:design` for S-9 (`EditorChipRow`, `DateChip`); `AccountChip`, `PayerChip`, `SplitChip` were removed in `1328afe`. Landed by M8e (`a59abeb`). | Owner finding (D-102): chips moved when a value changed; S-19 had the same chips row. | SPEC §13.3 (S-19); `docs/ux/design-spec.md` §3.7, S-19 |
| D-108 | 2026-10-18 | Navigation is instant. Every destination change (pushed screens, bottom-destination switches, S-7 and S-9 and the other editors, onboarding and the session gate) has no enter, exit, pop or size transition (`EnterTransition.None` / `ExitTransition.None`, no `SizeTransform`, set once on the app's `NavHost`, `NavTransitions` in `:app`). Replaces the Navigation bullet of design-spec §2.11. Motion inside a screen (ripples, state layers, expanding sections, FAB extend/collapse, bottom-sheet open, the seesaw and bunting) is unchanged. Not a contract change. Landed by M8f (`956908a`). | Owner finding on the S26, 2026-10-18: the default 700 ms fades made the app feel slow. | SPEC §13.2; `docs/ux/design-spec.md` §2.11 |
| D-109 | 2026-10-18 | S-16 shows a rejected change's lost version read-only. `Rejection` gains `lost: RejectedVersion?`, with `RejectedVersion(row: LedgerRow, accountName: String?, payer: User?, mode: SplitMode?, shares: List<Share>, notes: String, deleted: Boolean)` decoded in `:data` from `sync_rejections.rejected_payload` (the entity as pushed; `row` is the ledger row it would have been, `pending` false; for a settlement `accountName`, `payer` and `mode` are null and `shares` empty). `lost` is null when the payload cannot be decoded or its category or a user is not on the phone. "Öppna" on a rejection opens a dialog "Din version" (`home_sync_lost_title`, body `home_sync_lost_body`) with the read-only ledger row, account, payer, split and notes, the badge "Du tog bort den här" (`home_sync_lost_deleted`) for a refused deletion, and "Visa nuvarande version" (`home_sync_lost_show_current`), which opens S-8 or S-10; without `lost` it opens the current version as before. The `:core:design` ledger rows take a nullable `onClick` (null = read-only). Landed by M12f (`dc7a296`). UI contract change. | AC-coverage audit: S-16's "open a rejected change (read-only)" opened the current editable row, not the lost change. | SPEC §13.3 (S-16), §13.4, §14.2.4, §14.4.6; `docs/ux/design-spec.md` S-16 |
@@ -121,6 +121,8 @@ entry and the old one a strike-through plus a pointer. The spec is updated in th
| D-114 | 2026-10-18 | Upload and token limits. A picture upload (E-9, AC-4.4) must also be at most 16 000 000 pixels (width × height, for example 4000 × 4000) and decode to at most 64 MB (16 MP × 4 bytes, so a 16-bit image is refused above 8 MP), checked from the image header before decoding with the decoder limits set as well (`MAX_PIXELS`, `MAX_DECODE_ALLOC` in `src/api/pictures.rs`), refused with `image_invalid`; the 8000 px per side and 5 MiB limits stay. `fcm_token` at E-17 is 1 to 512 characters after trimming (`FCM_TOKEN_MAX`); longer is `invalid_request` with field `fcm_token`, like the empty string (D-034); a Firebase Installation ID has 22 characters. Landed by the server overhaul (`baa5806`, `b985ce9`). | Security review M-3: 8000 × 8000 decodes to 256 MB RGBA, above the 160 MiB container. L-4: a device could store a token up to the 1 MiB body limit, sent to FCM in every push. | SPEC §4 (AC-4.4), §9.6, §14.3.4 (E-17) |
| D-115 | 2026-10-18 | Rate-limit token acceptance, revising D-032: a bearer token is accepted only when a response to it is 2xx; a request with a token not yet accepted counts against its client IP's unauthenticated limit before it runs and is refused with `rate_limited` once the IP is over; a 2xx gives that count back; a 401 for an accepted token counts against the IP and withdraws the acceptance; token entries are pruned once their window expires, accepted or not; every 401 counts against the IP exactly once. Landed by the server overhaul (`725901c`), with unit tests per rule and an integration test of random tokens without the protocol header (60 × 426, then 429, the paired device unaffected). | Security review H-1: a random token without `X-Kvitt-Protocol` (426) became accepted for good, bypassed the IP limit and was never pruned, so a stranger could grow the in-memory map without bound. | SPEC §8.6 |
| D-116 | 2026-10-18 | Notifications are posted with `VISIBILITY_PRIVATE` and a public version carrying the generic "Kvitt" / "Open Kvitt to see it" (`notif_generic_title`, `notif_generic_body`), so a secure lock screen shows no description, amount, account or name (new AC-13.9; `NotificationPrivacyTest`). L-6 (a link can prefill any server on S-1) stays as built: S-1 opens its server row expanded when the link's server is not the release default, release builds require `https://`, and a paired phone ignores links (D-084); a confirmation step would need a design state and is not in v1 (OQ-6). Landed by M12f (`2bd6b58`). | Security review L-7 and L-6. | SPEC §4 (AC-2.6, AC-2.8, AC-13.9), §12 (OQ-6) |
| D-117 | 2026-10-18 | Infra security fixes, landed `7fb86f5`. (1) Caddy's access log and error log (`log default`) filter `request>uri` with ``regexp `^(/i/)[^?]+\|([?]).+` `${1}${2}REDACTED` `` (`wrap json`), so invite codes and the `?from=` name never reach a log; `Authorization` stays redacted by default. (2) Deferred response headers `Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'none'; style-src 'unsafe-inline'; base-uri 'none'; form-action 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'"`, `X-Content-Type-Options nosniff`, `X-Frame-Options DENY`, `Referrer-Policy no-referrer`. (3) The `caddy` container runs as `10002:10002` with `group_add` 1000, `read_only`, `cap_drop: [ALL]` plus `cap_add: [NET_BIND_SERVICE]` (the image's binary has that file capability and cannot be exec'd without it), `no-new-privileges`, tmpfs `/config` and `/tmp`; `install.sh` sets `/certs` 0750 1000:1000 and `caddy_data` to 10002 (extends D-105). (4) The development stack mounts `infra/dev/secrets/` (git-ignored), into which `up.sh` copies only `fcm-service-account.json`. (5) `deploy.sh` and `install.sh` print each pulled image's digest and append `<UTC time> <KVITT_TAG> <image reference> <digest>` to `/opt/kvitt/deployed-digests`, with a WARNING when a recorded reference changed digest; the workflow prints the pushed digests. (6) `kvitt_cicd` needs only `write:package` (the tag push uses the checkout credentials). (7) The plain root key (variant B) for cert-sync is no longer acceptable: variant A (restricted) or a dedicated non-root user. (8) One-off check after the router forward that Caddy's `remote_ip` shows public addresses. | Security review at `18c527f`: L-1, L-2, L-5, L-9, M-2, I-5. | SPEC §8.7, §8.9, §10 intro, §10.2, §10.3, §10.5.1, §10.5.2, §10.10; `infra/pi/`, `infra/dev/`, `.gitea/workflows/build-images.yaml`, `infra/README.md` |
| D-117 | 2026-10-18 | Infra security fixes, landed `7fb86f5`. (1) ~~Caddy's access log and error log (`log default`) filter `request>uri` with ``regexp `^(/i/)[^?]+\|([?]).+` `${1}${2}REDACTED` `` (`wrap json`), so invite codes and the `?from=` name never reach a log; `Authorization` stays redacted by default.~~ (revised by D-120: NPM's `location ^~ /i/` without access or error log; NPM logs no request headers) (2) ~~Deferred~~ Response headers `Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'none'; style-src 'unsafe-inline'; base-uri 'none'; form-action 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'"`, `X-Content-Type-Options nosniff`, `X-Frame-Options DENY`, `Referrer-Policy no-referrer` (revised by D-120: set at NPM's server level with the server's copies hidden). (3) ~~The `caddy` container runs as `10002:10002` with `group_add` 1000, `read_only`, `cap_drop: [ALL]` plus `cap_add: [NET_BIND_SERVICE]` (the image's binary has that file capability and cannot be exec'd without it), `no-new-privileges`, tmpfs `/config` and `/tmp`; `install.sh` sets `/certs` 0750 1000:1000 and `caddy_data` to 10002 (extends D-105).~~ (removed by D-120) (4) The development stack mounts `infra/dev/secrets/` (git-ignored), into which `up.sh` copies only `fcm-service-account.json`. (5) `deploy.sh` and `install.sh` print each pulled image's digest and append `<UTC time> <KVITT_TAG> <image reference> <digest>` to `/opt/kvitt/deployed-digests`, with a WARNING when a recorded reference changed digest; the workflow prints the pushed digests. (6) `kvitt_cicd` needs only `write:package` (the tag push uses the checkout credentials). (7) ~~The plain root key (variant B) for cert-sync is no longer acceptable: variant A (restricted) or a dedicated non-root user.~~ (moot since D-120: no Home Assistant SSH key) (8) ~~One-off check after the router forward that Caddy's `remote_ip` shows public addresses.~~ (revised by D-120: the conntrack check of SPEC §10.10) | Security review at `18c527f`: L-1, L-2, L-5, L-9, M-2, I-5. | SPEC §8.7, §8.9, §10 intro, §10.2, §10.3, §10.5.1, §10.5.2, §10.10; `infra/pi/`, `infra/dev/`, `.gitea/workflows/build-images.yaml`, `infra/README.md` |
| D-118 | 2026-10-18 | Shared test support lives in `:core:design`'s test fixtures (`src/testFixtures`, package `se.hagstedt.kvitt.design.testing`: `Variant`, `TestClock`, `TestEnvironment`, `ScreenSnapshots` with capture modes `Root`/`Screen`/`ScreenWhenIdle`, `MainDispatcherRule`, `withMain`), consumed as `testImplementation(testFixtures(project(":core:design")))`; not a module, so the §6.2 graph is unchanged; the architecture check rejects test fixtures outside test configurations. The convention plugin `kvitt.android.screenshots` wires Roborazzi and the test libraries; feature build scripts carry no screenshot block. Shared failure texts (`format/Failures.kt`: `FAILURE_NETWORK`, `commonFailureText`), limits (`format/Limits.kt`: `BP_TOTAL`, `DISPLAY_NAME_MAX`, `DESCRIPTION_MAX`, `NOTES_MAX`, `FIRST_DATE`, `DAYS_AHEAD_MAX`) and `savedSplitLabel` live in `:core:design`. `KvittMotion` holds only the seesaw spring; `KvittIcon.Description` and unused dimens/shapes removed; catalog entries `roborazzi-junit-rule`, `roborazzi-compose`, `androidx-hilt-navigation-compose`, `androidx-lifecycle-viewmodel-compose` removed; one `CopyCategoryKeywords` task shared by `:data` and `:core:fakes`. 941 tests, no golden changed, release APK 10.46 MB. Landed by the Android overhaul (`e4e6e5d` to `c582363`). | Eight modules each had a copy of the same screenshot harness, and M12f had to fix the same capture bug in two of them; test fixtures rather than a `:core:testing` module let `:core:design`'s own tests use them, add no module to the §6.2 graph and are treated by lint as test sources. The failure-text map, the limits (`BP_TOTAL` in five copies) and the saved-split label were duplicated across features; the removed tokens, icon and catalog entries were never referenced. | SPEC §6.2 (`:core:design` row, Screenshot tests), §11.1, §11.3; `docs/ux/design-spec.md` §2.11 and the icon table; `android/README.md` |
| D-119 | 2026-10-19 | APK download rate limit. E-6 `GET /apk/files/{file_name}` is limited to 10 requests per minute per client IP in its own fixed window (`APK_DOWNLOAD_LIMIT` in `src/api/rate_limit.rs`), separate from and not counted against the 60 per minute of the other unauthenticated endpoints; the client IP as in D-032 (peer, or the last `X-Forwarded-For` entry from the trusted proxy); refusals are 429 `rate_limited` with `Retry-After`; every request counts, a 404 included; in memory, pruned like the other windows. E-5 `GET /apk/latest` and E-4 `GET /i/{code}` stay on the 60 per minute. Landed `96e4cbd` (unit test and an integration test in `tests/core_api/rate_limit.rs`). Owner: "APK download limit assumed is OK". | Security review L-3: each E-6 answer can be a ~10 MB APK, so 60 per minute per IP let one client pull about 600 MB a minute from the Pi; E-5 and E-4 answers are small and the phone checks E-5 at most every 6 hours (AC-16.2). | SPEC §8.6, §10.6, §14.3.4 (E-6), §11.4 |
| D-120 | 2026-10-19 | TLS terminates in the owner's Nginx Proxy Manager (NPM) on the Home Assistant Pi instead of Caddy and cert-sync, which are removed (`infra/cert-sync/**`, `infra/pi/Caddyfile`, images, volumes `certs` and `caddy_data`, secrets `ha_ssh_key` and `ha_known_hosts`, `.env` keys `HA_PORT`, `HA_USER`, `HA_CERT_DIR`). (1) Kvitt gets its own public host name `KVITT_PUBLIC_HOST` (owner-chosen, recorded in HANDOFF; a DuckDNS name is being set up), because `icehack.asuscomm.com` is NPM's proxy host for Home Assistant and NPM selects by name. `KVITT_PUBLIC_URL=https://${KVITT_PUBLIC_HOST}:8443`. A path prefix on another name is not supported. (2) The router forwards external TCP 8443 to the Home Assistant Pi's 443 (NPM); nothing is forwarded to the Kvitt Pi. NPM issues the name's Let's Encrypt certificate via HTTP-01 on port 80. (3) The Kvitt Pi runs `server` (publishes 8080 on all LAN interfaces, hardening unchanged) and `backup` (unchanged, D-105). NPM forwards plain HTTP over the LAN (accepted by the owner). (4) `KVITT_TRUSTED_PROXY=${HA_HOST}`, NPM's LAN IPv4 address, checked by `install.sh`; the server is unchanged and takes the last `X-Forwarded-For` entry from that peer. (5) The NPM proxy-host settings and the Custom Nginx Configuration of §10.5.2 carry over D-117's headers and log redaction: headers at server level with the server's copies hidden; its own `location /` without `add_header` (NPM's default adds `X-Served-By`, which makes nginx drop server-level headers); `location ^~ /i/` with `access_log off` and `error_log /dev/null crit` because NPM's access log writes `$request_uri` with the query string; `client_max_body_size 6m`; `proxy_read_timeout 60s`; HSTS on (NPM's 2 years). (6) Health checks: `http://localhost:8080/health` on the Pi, then through NPM (warning only); `install.sh` removes the old stack's leftovers. (7) Gitea login: the secret is interpolated in the `run` line (`printf '%s' "${{ secrets.kvitt_cicd }}" \| docker login …`), the owner's proven form, because the env-based form came through empty on act_runner 0.6.1 with a user-level secret; this reverses L-8's 'never expanded inside a shell line'; act_runner masks the value. Revises D-103 (bundle files), D-104 (images, Caddy pin, cert-sync packages, trigger path), D-106 (cert-sync part), D-117 parts 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, D-023's cert-sync secrets. Verified on the Mac 2026-10-19: nginx -t against NPM v2.16.0 templates; rehearsal server-behind-nginx 21 checks passed (headers once each, HSTS, http→https 301, 413 at 7 MB, rate limit per forwarded client, forged X-Forwarded-For contained, invite code/name/`/i/` absent from nginx logs including on 502). | Owner 2026-10-19: NPM already manages Let's Encrypt; the HA name is taken; 8443 → NPM 443 confirmed. | SPEC §8.5, §8.7, §8.9, §10 intro, §10.1, §10.2, §10.3, §10.4, §10.5, §10.7, §10.10, §11.2, §14.7 |
| D-121 | 2026-10-19 | The Android app's public host is a build property. `kvitt.publicHost` is read from the Gradle property (`-Pkvitt.publicHost=…`), else the key `kvitt.publicHost` in `android/local.properties` (owner's, git-ignored), else the placeholder `kvitt.example.invalid` (RFC 2606; never resolves, so a release built without it cannot reach a real host). The build refuses a value that is not a host name. `:app` exposes it as `BuildConfig.PUBLIC_HOST`, as the manifest placeholder `publicHost` (the AC-2.6 `https` intent filter, port 8443, `/i/`, `autoVerify="false"`) and as `RELEASE_SERVER_URL` = `https://<host>:8443` (`link/ReleaseServer.kt`). `:feature:onboarding` receives that URL through the Hilt qualifier `@ReleaseServerUrl` for S-1's prefill and its non-default-server check. Invite-link parsing still accepts a server named by the link (AC-2.6). Tests and goldens use fixed fixture hosts. `infra/publish-apk.sh` passes `-Pkvitt.publicHost` from `KVITT_PUBLIC_HOST` (follow-up agent running). The pinned-root config's domain (D-082) is still the old literal and must follow the property if that fallback is ever prepared. Landed `d090c6c`. | D-120 gave Kvitt its own host name; it was hard-coded in three places. | SPEC AC-2.6, AC-2.7, §8.5, §10.5.3, §10.6, §13.3 S-1, §12 OQ-6; `android/README.md` |