Files
kvitt/infra/pi/compose.yaml
T
jacobh2 7fb86f5524 Infra security fixes: Caddy log redaction, headers and non-root container; dev mounts only the FCM key; deploy records image digests (D-117)
- Caddyfile: access and error logs replace the /i/<code> segment and every query string with REDACTED
  (regexp filter on request>uri); Authorization stays redacted by default. Deferred response headers:
  Content-Security-Policy, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, Referrer-Policy.
- Pi compose: caddy as uid 10002 with group 1000, read-only root, cap_drop ALL plus NET_BIND_SERVICE
  (needed to exec the image's file-capability binary), tmpfs /config and /tmp; install.sh sets /certs
  0750 1000:1000 and Caddy's /data to 10002.
- deploy.sh and install.sh print the pulled image digests and append them to /opt/kvitt/deployed-digests,
  warning when a recorded tag changed digest; the workflow prints the pushed digests; kvitt_cicd needs
  only write:package.
- Dev stack: up.sh stages only fcm-service-account.json into infra/dev/secrets/ (git-ignored), mounted
  read-only at /secrets.
- README: restricted cert-sync key required (plain root key not acceptable), remote_ip and log checks,
  APK download note, owner decisions (backup encryption, APK limit, key form, token scope), overhaul lines.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TQd3pEP9UeN2uifbHknQ7B
2026-10-18 22:24:32 +02:00

152 lines
4.9 KiB
YAML

# Kvitt production stack on the Kvitt Pi (SPEC §10.2). Deployed by install.sh to /opt/kvitt/compose.yaml together
# with /opt/kvitt/Caddyfile and /opt/kvitt/.env (from .env.example). Run every command from /opt/kvitt.
# Only caddy publishes a port (8443); the server, Caddy's admin API and the sidecars are reachable only on the
# internal network `kvitt` (SPEC §8.9).
# Image names: ${KVITT_REGISTRY}/kvitt-<name>, the names the Gitea Actions workflow pushes (D-104).
name: kvitt
x-logging: &logging
driver: json-file
options:
max-size: "10m"
max-file: "3"
services:
caddy:
# Official image, pinned by version and multi-arch index digest (resolved 2026-10-18, infra/README.md).
image: docker.io/library/caddy:2.11.7@sha256:685ae3d7c34d9b5f8caeddc5d14051db7bbd88ff1f5a2fa0c16bd8ca328fb7af
restart: unless-stopped
# Non-root (D-117): uid 10002, plus group 1000 (cert-sync's group) to read the 0640 files in the 0750 /certs.
# 8443 needs no capability, but the image's /usr/bin/caddy carries the file capability cap_net_bind_service=ep,
# and the kernel refuses to exec it when that capability is not in the bounding set (checked 2026-10-18:
# "exec container process /usr/bin/caddy: Operation not permitted" with cap_drop ALL alone). So NET_BIND_SERVICE
# is the one capability kept. caddy_data (/data) is owned by 10002 (install.sh); /config (autosave of the loaded
# config) and /tmp are tmpfs, the rest of the root filesystem is read-only.
user: "10002:10002"
group_add: ["1000"]
read_only: true
cap_drop: [ALL]
cap_add: [NET_BIND_SERVICE]
security_opt:
- no-new-privileges:true
tmpfs:
- /config
- /tmp
mem_limit: 64m
ports:
- "8443:8443"
environment:
TZ: Europe/Stockholm
volumes:
- ./Caddyfile:/etc/caddy/Caddyfile:ro
- certs:/certs:ro
- caddy_data:/data
depends_on:
cert-sync:
condition: service_healthy
server:
condition: service_started
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "wget -qO- http://localhost:2019/config/ >/dev/null"]
interval: 30s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
start_period: 10s
logging: *logging
networks: [kvitt]
server:
image: ${KVITT_REGISTRY:?set KVITT_REGISTRY in .env}/kvitt-server:${KVITT_TAG:?set KVITT_TAG in .env}
command: ["serve"]
restart: unless-stopped
user: "10001:10001"
read_only: true
cap_drop: [ALL]
security_opt:
- no-new-privileges:true
mem_limit: 160m
environment:
TZ: Europe/Stockholm
# The remaining server settings keep their SPEC §10.4 defaults (KVITT_PUBLIC_URL
# https://icehack.asuscomm.com:8443, KVITT_TRUSTED_PROXY caddy, KVITT_FCM_PROJECT_ID kvitt-1337, ...).
KVITT_DATA_DIR: /data
volumes:
- data:/data
- /opt/kvitt/secrets/fcm-service-account.json:/secrets/fcm-service-account.json:ro
# Empty except during the one-off Splitwise import (SPEC §10.8, D-025).
- /opt/kvitt/import:/import:ro
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD", "kvitt-server", "healthcheck"]
interval: 30s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
start_period: 20s
logging: *logging
networks: [kvitt]
cert-sync:
image: ${KVITT_REGISTRY}/kvitt-cert-sync:${KVITT_TAG}
restart: unless-stopped
user: "1000:1000"
cap_drop: [ALL]
security_opt:
- no-new-privileges:true
mem_limit: 32m
environment:
TZ: Europe/Stockholm
HA_HOST: ${HA_HOST:?set HA_HOST in .env}
HA_PORT: ${HA_PORT:-22}
HA_USER: ${HA_USER:?set HA_USER in .env}
HA_CERT_DIR: ${HA_CERT_DIR:?set HA_CERT_DIR in .env}
volumes:
- certs:/certs
- ./Caddyfile:/etc/caddy/Caddyfile:ro
- /opt/kvitt/secrets/ha_ssh_key:/secrets/ha_ssh_key:ro
- /opt/kvitt/secrets/ha_known_hosts:/secrets/known_hosts:ro
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "test -s /certs/fullchain.pem && test -s /certs/privkey.pem"]
interval: 30s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
start_period: 60s
logging: *logging
networks: [kvitt]
backup:
image: ${KVITT_REGISTRY}/kvitt-backup:${KVITT_TAG}
restart: unless-stopped
# uid 10001 like the server, so it can open the WAL database files the server owns; rclone.conf on the Pi is
# therefore owned by 10001 (infra/README.md "Backup uid", D-105).
user: "10001:10001"
cap_drop: [ALL]
security_opt:
- no-new-privileges:true
mem_limit: 96m
environment:
TZ: Europe/Stockholm
RCLONE_REMOTE: ${RCLONE_REMOTE:-gdrive:}
RCLONE_FOLDER_ID: ${RCLONE_FOLDER_ID:?set RCLONE_FOLDER_ID in .env}
volumes:
- data:/data
- backups:/backups
- /opt/kvitt/secrets/rclone.conf:/config/rclone/rclone.conf:ro
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD", "/healthcheck.sh"]
interval: 5m
timeout: 10s
retries: 1
start_period: 30s
logging: *logging
networks: [kvitt]
volumes:
data:
certs:
caddy_data:
backups:
networks:
kvitt:
driver: bridge