Files
kvitt/server/crates/kvitt-server/src/api/rate_limit.rs
T

445 lines
16 KiB
Rust

//! Rate limiting (SPEC §8.6, AC-2.12, §8.5), as a tower layer that `router.rs` attaches to every route.
//!
//! * Unauthenticated endpoints (E-1 to E-6 and unknown paths): at most 60 requests per minute per client IP.
//! * Authenticated endpoints: at most 600 requests per minute per device, keyed by the hash of the bearer token
//! (the token identifies the device; the limiter never touches the database). A request to an authenticated
//! endpoint without a well-formed bearer token counts against its IP like an unauthenticated one. A response 401
//! also counts against the IP, and once the IP is over its limit, tokens that have never been accepted are refused
//! too, so random tokens do not bypass the IP limit.
//! * Invite accepts: after 10 failed accepts (any 4xx other than 429) from one IP within 60 minutes, every accept
//! from that IP is `rate_limited` until the 60 minutes since the first of those failures have passed.
//!
//! Refusals are 429 `rate_limited` with `Retry-After` in whole seconds. Windows are fixed: they start at the first
//! request (or failure) counted and last one minute (one hour for accept failures). Everything is in memory and resets
//! on restart; there is no table.
//!
//! The client IP is the TCP peer (axum `ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>`), or the last `X-Forwarded-For` entry when the peer
//! is an address of `KVITT_TRUSTED_PROXY` (Caddy, SPEC §8.5). The host name is resolved lazily and re-resolved at most
//! once per [`PROXY_RESOLVE_INTERVAL`]; a name that does not resolve means no peer is trusted (D-022). Without
//! `ConnectInfo` (a server not started with `into_make_service_with_connect_info`) all clients share one IP bucket.
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::convert::Infallible;
use std::net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr, SocketAddr};
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard};
use std::task::{Context, Poll};
use std::time::Instant;
use axum::extract::{ConnectInfo, MatchedPath, Request};
use axum::http::StatusCode;
use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Response};
use chrono::{DateTime, Duration, Utc};
use tower::{Layer, Service};
use crate::AppState;
use crate::audit::BoxFuture;
use crate::auth::{is_token_shaped, sha256_hex};
use crate::error::AppError;
use crate::time::Clock;
/// Unauthenticated requests per window per client IP (SPEC §8.6).
pub const UNAUTHENTICATED_LIMIT: u32 = 60;
/// Authenticated requests per window per device (SPEC §8.6).
pub const AUTHENTICATED_LIMIT: u32 = 600;
/// The request window (SPEC §8.6: per minute).
pub const REQUEST_WINDOW: Duration = Duration::minutes(1);
/// Failed invite accepts tolerated per IP within [`ACCEPT_FAILURE_WINDOW`] (AC-2.12).
pub const ACCEPT_FAILURE_LIMIT: u32 = 10;
/// The invite-accept failure window (AC-2.12).
pub const ACCEPT_FAILURE_WINDOW: Duration = Duration::minutes(60);
/// How long a resolution of `KVITT_TRUSTED_PROXY` is reused.
pub const PROXY_RESOLVE_INTERVAL: std::time::Duration = std::time::Duration::from_secs(60);
/// How often expired windows are pruned from memory.
const PRUNE_INTERVAL: Duration = Duration::minutes(10);
/// Route templates of the unauthenticated endpoints (E-1 to E-6).
const PUBLIC_ROUTES: [&str; 6] = [
"/health",
"/setup/status",
"/invites/accept",
"/i/{code}",
"/apk/latest",
"/apk/files/{file_name}",
];
const ACCEPT_ROUTE: &str = "/invites/accept";
/// The layer for `router.rs`. One limiter per router: build the router once and reuse it (as `serve` does).
pub fn layer(state: &AppState) -> RateLimitLayer {
RateLimitLayer {
limiter: Arc::new(Limiter::new(
state.clock.clone(),
state.config.trusted_proxy.clone(),
)),
}
}
/// A fixed counting window.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
struct Window {
start: DateTime<Utc>,
count: u32,
}
impl Window {
fn expired(&self, now: DateTime<Utc>, len: Duration) -> bool {
now >= self.start + len
}
fn retry_after(&self, now: DateTime<Utc>, len: Duration) -> u64 {
let remaining = (self.start + len - now).num_milliseconds().max(0);
u64::try_from((remaining + 999) / 1000).unwrap_or(1).max(1)
}
}
/// Counts one request in `slot` unless the window is full; `Err(retry_after_secs)` when it is.
fn hit(
slot: &mut Option<Window>,
now: DateTime<Utc>,
len: Duration,
limit: u32,
) -> Result<(), u64> {
let window = match slot {
Some(w) if !w.expired(now, len) => w,
_ => slot.insert(Window {
start: now,
count: 0,
}),
};
if window.count >= limit {
return Err(window.retry_after(now, len));
}
window.count += 1;
Ok(())
}
/// Whether `slot` is full (without counting).
fn full(slot: Option<&Window>, now: DateTime<Utc>, len: Duration, limit: u32) -> Option<u64> {
slot.filter(|w| !w.expired(now, len) && w.count >= limit)
.map(|w| w.retry_after(now, len))
}
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
struct TokenState {
window: Option<Window>,
/// The token has had a response other than 401: it belongs to a device.
accepted: bool,
}
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
struct Buckets {
ip: HashMap<IpAddr, Window>,
tokens: HashMap<String, TokenState>,
accept_failures: HashMap<IpAddr, Window>,
last_prune: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
}
impl Buckets {
fn prune(&mut self, now: DateTime<Utc>) {
if self.last_prune.is_some_and(|t| now - t < PRUNE_INTERVAL) {
return;
}
self.last_prune = Some(now);
self.ip.retain(|_, w| !w.expired(now, REQUEST_WINDOW));
self.tokens
.retain(|_, t| t.accepted || t.window.is_some_and(|w| !w.expired(now, REQUEST_WINDOW)));
self.accept_failures
.retain(|_, w| !w.expired(now, ACCEPT_FAILURE_WINDOW));
}
}
/// How a request is counted.
enum Key {
Ip(IpAddr),
Token { ip: IpAddr, hash: String },
}
/// The shared limiter state.
pub struct Limiter {
clock: Arc<dyn Clock>,
trusted_proxy: String,
proxy: Mutex<Option<(Instant, Vec<IpAddr>)>>,
buckets: Mutex<Buckets>,
}
fn lock<T>(mutex: &Mutex<T>) -> MutexGuard<'_, T> {
match mutex.lock() {
Ok(guard) => guard,
Err(poisoned) => poisoned.into_inner(),
}
}
impl Limiter {
pub fn new(clock: Arc<dyn Clock>, trusted_proxy: String) -> Self {
Self {
clock,
trusted_proxy,
proxy: Mutex::new(None),
buckets: Mutex::new(Buckets::default()),
}
}
/// The addresses of `KVITT_TRUSTED_PROXY`, resolved at most once per [`PROXY_RESOLVE_INTERVAL`].
async fn proxy_addrs(&self) -> Vec<IpAddr> {
if let Some((at, addrs)) = lock(&self.proxy).as_ref()
&& at.elapsed() < PROXY_RESOLVE_INTERVAL
{
return addrs.clone();
}
let name = self.trusted_proxy.trim();
let addrs: Vec<IpAddr> = if name.is_empty() {
Vec::new()
} else if let Ok(ip) = name.parse::<IpAddr>() {
vec![ip]
} else {
match tokio::net::lookup_host((name, 0)).await {
Ok(found) => found.map(|a| a.ip()).collect(),
Err(_) => Vec::new(),
}
};
*lock(&self.proxy) = Some((Instant::now(), addrs.clone()));
addrs
}
/// The TCP peer and the last `X-Forwarded-For` entry of `request`.
fn peer_and_forwarded(request: &Request) -> (Option<IpAddr>, Option<IpAddr>) {
let peer = request
.extensions()
.get::<ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>>()
.map(|c| c.0.ip());
let forwarded = request
.headers()
.get("x-forwarded-for")
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.and_then(|v| v.rsplit(',').next())
.and_then(|v| v.trim().parse::<IpAddr>().ok());
(peer, forwarded)
}
/// The client IP (SPEC §8.5): the forwarded address when the peer is the trusted proxy, else the peer.
async fn client_ip(&self, peer: Option<IpAddr>, forwarded: Option<IpAddr>) -> IpAddr {
let Some(peer) = peer else {
return IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED);
};
match forwarded {
Some(client) if self.proxy_addrs().await.contains(&peer) => client,
_ => peer,
}
}
fn key(request: &Request, route: &str, ip: IpAddr) -> Key {
if PUBLIC_ROUTES.contains(&route) || route.is_empty() {
return Key::Ip(ip);
}
let token = request
.headers()
.get(axum::http::header::AUTHORIZATION)
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.and_then(|v| v.split_once(' '))
.filter(|(scheme, _)| scheme.eq_ignore_ascii_case("bearer"))
.map(|(_, token)| token.trim())
.filter(|token| is_token_shaped(token));
match token {
Some(token) => Key::Token {
ip,
hash: sha256_hex(token),
},
None => Key::Ip(ip),
}
}
/// Counts the request before it runs; `Err(retry_after_secs)` refuses it.
fn admit(&self, key: &Key, accept: bool, now: DateTime<Utc>) -> Result<(), u64> {
let mut buckets = lock(&self.buckets);
buckets.prune(now);
match key {
Key::Ip(ip) => {
if accept
&& let Some(retry) = full(
buckets.accept_failures.get(ip),
now,
ACCEPT_FAILURE_WINDOW,
ACCEPT_FAILURE_LIMIT,
)
{
return Err(retry);
}
let mut slot = buckets.ip.get(ip).copied();
let result = hit(&mut slot, now, REQUEST_WINDOW, UNAUTHENTICATED_LIMIT);
if let Some(w) = slot {
buckets.ip.insert(*ip, w);
}
result
}
Key::Token { ip, hash } => {
let accepted = buckets.tokens.get(hash).is_some_and(|t| t.accepted);
if !accepted
&& let Some(retry) = full(
buckets.ip.get(ip),
now,
REQUEST_WINDOW,
UNAUTHENTICATED_LIMIT,
)
{
return Err(retry);
}
let state = buckets.tokens.entry(hash.clone()).or_default();
hit(&mut state.window, now, REQUEST_WINDOW, AUTHENTICATED_LIMIT)
}
}
}
/// Records what the response says about the request (401s, accept failures, accepted tokens).
fn record(&self, key: &Key, accept: bool, status: StatusCode, now: DateTime<Utc>) {
let mut buckets = lock(&self.buckets);
match key {
Key::Ip(ip) => {
if accept && status.is_client_error() && status != StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS {
let mut slot = buckets.accept_failures.get(ip).copied();
// The window is refused once full (admit), so this count never exceeds the limit.
let _ = hit(&mut slot, now, ACCEPT_FAILURE_WINDOW, ACCEPT_FAILURE_LIMIT);
if let Some(w) = slot {
buckets.accept_failures.insert(*ip, w);
}
}
}
Key::Token { ip, hash } => {
if status == StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED {
let mut slot = buckets.ip.get(ip).copied();
let _ = hit(&mut slot, now, REQUEST_WINDOW, UNAUTHENTICATED_LIMIT);
if let Some(w) = slot {
buckets.ip.insert(*ip, w);
}
} else if status != StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS {
buckets.tokens.entry(hash.clone()).or_default().accepted = true;
}
}
}
}
async fn handle<S>(self: Arc<Self>, request: Request, mut inner: S) -> Response
where
S: Service<Request, Response = Response, Error = Infallible>,
{
let route = request
.extensions()
.get::<MatchedPath>()
.map(|p| p.as_str().to_owned())
.unwrap_or_default();
let accept = route == ACCEPT_ROUTE;
let (peer, forwarded) = Self::peer_and_forwarded(&request);
let ip = self.client_ip(peer, forwarded).await;
let key = Self::key(&request, &route, ip);
if let Err(retry_after) = self.admit(&key, accept, self.clock.now()) {
return AppError::rate_limited(retry_after).into_response();
}
let response = match inner.call(request).await {
Ok(response) => response,
Err(never) => match never {},
};
self.record(&key, accept, response.status(), self.clock.now());
response
}
}
/// The tower layer of [`layer`].
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct RateLimitLayer {
limiter: Arc<Limiter>,
}
impl<S> Layer<S> for RateLimitLayer {
type Service = RateLimit<S>;
fn layer(&self, inner: S) -> Self::Service {
RateLimit {
inner,
limiter: self.limiter.clone(),
}
}
}
/// The rate-limiting service wrapping one route.
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct RateLimit<S> {
inner: S,
limiter: Arc<Limiter>,
}
impl<S> Service<Request> for RateLimit<S>
where
S: Service<Request, Response = Response, Error = Infallible> + Clone + Send + 'static,
S::Future: Send + 'static,
{
type Response = Response;
type Error = Infallible;
type Future = BoxFuture<'static, Result<Response, Infallible>>;
fn poll_ready(&mut self, cx: &mut Context<'_>) -> Poll<Result<(), Self::Error>> {
self.inner.poll_ready(cx)
}
fn call(&mut self, request: Request) -> Self::Future {
// The ready clone goes into the future; a fresh clone stays for the next call (tower's usual pattern).
let clone = self.inner.clone();
let inner = std::mem::replace(&mut self.inner, clone);
let limiter = self.limiter.clone();
Box::pin(async move { Ok(limiter.handle(request, inner).await) })
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::time::{FixedClock, parse_ts};
#[test]
fn fixed_window_counts_and_reports_retry_after() {
let now = parse_ts("2026-10-17T12:00:00.000Z").unwrap();
let mut slot = None;
for _ in 0..3 {
assert!(hit(&mut slot, now, REQUEST_WINDOW, 3).is_ok());
}
assert_eq!(
hit(&mut slot, now + Duration::seconds(20), REQUEST_WINDOW, 3),
Err(40)
);
assert!(hit(&mut slot, now + Duration::seconds(60), REQUEST_WINDOW, 3).is_ok());
}
#[test]
fn retry_after_rounds_up_and_is_at_least_one() {
let now = parse_ts("2026-10-17T12:00:00.000Z").unwrap();
let w = Window {
start: now,
count: 1,
};
assert_eq!(
w.retry_after(now + Duration::milliseconds(59_500), REQUEST_WINDOW),
1
);
assert_eq!(
w.retry_after(now + Duration::milliseconds(100), REQUEST_WINDOW),
60
);
}
#[test]
fn pruning_drops_expired_windows() {
let now = parse_ts("2026-10-17T12:00:00.000Z").unwrap();
let limiter = Limiter::new(Arc::new(FixedClock::new(now)), String::new());
let ip = IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST);
assert!(limiter.admit(&Key::Ip(ip), false, now).is_ok());
assert_eq!(lock(&limiter.buckets).ip.len(), 1);
assert!(
limiter
.admit(
&Key::Ip(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::BROADCAST)),
false,
now + Duration::minutes(11)
)
.is_ok()
);
assert_eq!(lock(&limiter.buckets).ip.len(), 1);
}
}